Psychology Research

Last week Greta was telling her class about a study that related to a well-known story. She started off the discussion with a reference to the story, indicating that “of course you all have heard the story of _______” (I can’t tell you the name of the story now because it’s the subject of our study). As you may have guessed by now, she was greeted by a roomful of blank stares. She was surprised, because she grew up hearing this story and assumed that her students would have heard it as well. So the question is, why? Do the common stories we all know go in and out of fashion over the course of generations? Or was this story just less familiar than Greta thought? We think we’ve devised a way to find out. Click here to participate As usual, this week’s study is brief, with about 20 questions. It should take only a few minutes to complete. You have until Thursday, March 19 to complete your response. There is no limit on the number of respondents. Don’t forget to come back next week for the results! Read the comments on this post…

Last week Greta was telling her class about a study that related to a well-known story. She started off the discussion with a reference to the story, indicating that “of course you all have heard the story of _______” (I can’t tell you the name of the story now because it’s the subject of our study). As you may have guessed by now, she was greeted by a roomful of blank stares. She was surprised, because she grew up hearing this story and assumed that her students would have heard it as well. So the question is, why? Do the common stories we all know go in and out of fashion over the course of generations? Or was this story just less familiar than Greta thought? We think we’ve devised a way to find out. Click here to participate As usual, this week’s study is brief, with about 20 questions. It should take only a few minutes to complete. You have until Thursday, March 19 to complete your response. There is no limit on the number of respondents. Don’t forget to come back next week for the results! Read the comments on this post…

Background Several recent studies have shown practice-dependent structural alterations in humans. Cross-sectional studies of intensive practice of specific tasks suggest associated long-term structural adaptations. Playing golf at a high level of performance is one of the most demanding sporting activities. In this study, we report the relationship between a particular level of proficiency in playing golf (indicated by golf handicap level) and specific neuroanatomical features. Principal Findings Using voxel-based morphometry (VBM) of grey (GM) and white matter (WM) volumes and fractional anisotropy (FA) measures of the fibre tracts, we identified differences between skilled (professional golfers and golfers with an handicap from 1–14) and less-skilled golfers (golfers with an handicap from 15–36 and non-golfer). Larger GM volumes were found in skilled golfers in a fronto-parietal network including premotor and parietal areas. Skilled golfers revealed smaller WM volume and FA values in the vicinity of the corticospinal tract at the level of the internal and external capsule and in the parietal operculum. However, there was no structural difference within the skilled and less-skilled golfer group. Conclusion There is no linear relationship between the anatomical findings and handicap level, amount of practice, and practice hours per year. There was however a strong difference between highly-practiced golfers (at least 800–3,000 hours) and those who have practised less or non-golfers without any golfing practise, thus indicating a step-wise structural and not a linear change.

Background Investigations following stroke first of all require information about the spatio-temporal dimension of the ischemic core as well as of perilesional and remote affected tissue. Here we systematically evaluated regions differently impaired by focal ischemia. Methodology/Principal Findings Wistar rats underwent a transient 30 or 120 min suture-occlusion of the middle cerebral artery (MCAO) followed by various reperfusion times (2 h, 1 d, 7 d, 30 d) or a permanent MCAO (1 d survival). Brains were characterized by TTC, thionine, and immunohistochemistry using MAP2, HSP72, and HSP27. TTC staining reliably identifies the infarct core at 1 d of reperfusion after 30 min MCAO and at all investigated times following 120 min and permanent MCAO. Nissl histology denotes the infarct core from 2 h up to 30 d after transient as well as permanent MCAO. Absent and attenuated MAP2 staining clearly identifies the infarct core and perilesional affected regions at all investigated times, respectively. HSP72 denotes perilesional areas in a limited post-ischemic time (1 d). HSP27 detects perilesional and remote impaired tissue from post-ischemic day 1 on. Furthermore a simultaneous expression of HSP72 and HSP27 in perilesional neurons was revealed. Conclusions/Significance TTC and Nissl staining can be applied to designate the infarct core. MAP2, HSP72, and HSP27 are excellent markers not only to identify perilesional and remote areas but also to discriminate affected neuronal and glial populations. Moreover markers vary in their confinement to different reperfusion times. The extent and consistency of infarcts increase with prolonged occlusion of the MCA. Therefore interindividual infarct dimension should be precisely assessed by the combined use of different markers as described in this study.

Precise identification of neuronal populations is a major challenge in neuroscience. In the striatum, more than 95% of neurons are GABAergic medium-sized spiny neurons (MSNs), which form two intermingled populations distinguished by their projections and protein content. Those expressing dopamine D 1 -receptors (D1Rs) project preferentially to the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr), whereas those expressing dopamine D 2 – receptors (D2Rs) project preferentially to the lateral part of the globus pallidus (LGP). The degree of segregation of these populations has been a continuous subject of debate, and the recent introduction of bacterial artificial chromosome (BAC) transgenic mice expressing fluorescent proteins driven by specific promoters was a major progress to facilitate striatal neuron identification. However, the fraction of MSNs labeled in these mice has been recently called into question, casting doubt on the generality of results obtained with such approaches. Here, we performed an in-depth quantitative analysis of striatal neurons in drd1a- EGFP and drd2- EGFP mice. We first quantified neuronal and non-neuronal populations in the striatum, based on nuclear staining with TO-PRO-3, and immunolabeling for NeuN, DARPP-32 (dopamine- and cAMP-regulated phosphoprotein Mr~32,000), and various markers for interneurons. TO-PRO-3 staining was sufficient to identify MSNs by their typical nuclear morphology and, with a good probability, interneuron populations. In drd1a -EGFP/ drd2 -EGFP double transgenic mice all MSNs expressed EGFP, which was driven in about half of them by drd1a promoter. Retrograde labeling showed that all MSNs projecting to the SNr expressed D1R and very few D2R (<1%). In contrast, our results were compatible with the existence of some D1R-EGFP-expressing fibers giving off terminals in the LGP. Thus, our study shows that nuclear staining is a simple method for identifying MSNs and other striatal neurons. It also unambiguously confirms the degree of segregation of MSNs in the mouse striatum and allows the full exploitation of results obtained with BAC-transgenic mice.

Last week we asked readers to rate two hypothetical job candidates for a communications assistant position in a large neuroscience lab. The task seemed to pit education against experience. Everyone saw some version of these two resumes: (click for a larger image) Emily was Magna Cum Laude at Harvard, while Suzanne was an average student at a regional state college. But Emily appeared to have never held a paying job, padding her resume with activities like “Botanical Garden Society President” and “Varsity Tennis.” Meanwhile, Suzanne had held an impressive internship and had three years of related job experience. Most respondents — nearly 80 percent out of over 800 who completed the survey — selected experience over education, preferring Suzanne over Emily. But that wasn’t the real purpose of our study. We were actually interested in a subtler point: should you put more effort into the overall look of your resume, or into proofreading to fix typographical errors? Respondents actually only saw one of three possible pairs of resumes. Each pair contained the same information, but one pair was full of typos (here’s an example ), while another pair was badly formatted, with ugly fonts and inconsistent layout (here’s an example ). The final group of respondents saw attractive and accurate resumes. So which resumes were rated highest? Here are the results: Read the rest of this post… | Read the comments on this post…

A few years ago we discussed a fascinating study which appeared to show that the main reason we stop eating at the end of a meal isn’t because we “feel” full. Instead, we simply see that we’ve finished eating the food in front of us, so we stop. We don’t eat more an hour later because we remember we just ate. In that study, led by Paul Rozin, experimenters provided two amnesic patients with two meals separated by just 15 minutes. They both did not recall eating the previous meal due to their medical condition, and each of them ate both meals as if they hadn’t had anything to eat. But maybe amnesia has additional subtle effects. The condition is usually caused by severe brain trauma, so it’s possible that amnesics (or the particular amnesics in the study) have also lost their ability to detect fullness. Could that explain their seemingly bizarre behavior? A team led by Suzanne Higgs identified two new patients who had a similar type of amnesia: They could not form new long-term memories, although their old memories and short-term memory were intact. They repeated Rozin’s multiple-meal study and found the same result: while people with normal memory refused a second lunch, both amnesic patients ate two full meals, consuming nearly 2,000 calories while the others ate only about 700. But in a separate experiment, volunteers (including the two amnesics) were presented with small samples of four different foods (a cookie, potato chips, rice pudding, and sandwiches) for tasting. They were asked to rate each food for taste, texture, and desire to eat. Next they were given a meal-sized portion of the sandwiches and asked to eat as much as they liked. Finally, they rated each item once more on the same scale. Here are the results: Read the rest of this post… | Read the comments on this post…

A few years ago we discussed a fascinating study which appeared to show that the main reason we stop eating at the end of a meal isn’t because we “feel” full. Instead, we simply see that we’ve finished eating the food in front of us, so we stop. We don’t eat more an hour later because we remember we just ate. In that study, led by Paul Rozin, experimenters provided two amnesic patients with two meals separated by just 15 minutes. They both did not recall eating the previous meal due to their medical condition, and each of them ate both meals as if they hadn’t had anything to eat. But maybe amnesia has additional subtle effects. The condition is usually caused by severe brain trauma, so it’s possible that amnesics (or the particular amnesics in the study) have also lost their ability to detect fullness. Could that explain their seemingly bizarre behavior? A team led by Suzanne Higgs identified two new patients who had a similar type of amnesia: They could not form new long-term memories, although their old memories and short-term memory were intact. They repeated Rozin’s multiple-meal study and found the same result: while people with normal memory refused a second lunch, both amnesic patients ate two full meals, consuming nearly 2,000 calories while the others ate only about 700. But in a separate experiment, volunteers (including the two amnesics) were presented with small samples of four different foods (a cookie, potato chips, rice pudding, and sandwiches) for tasting. They were asked to rate each food for taste, texture, and desire to eat. Next they were given a meal-sized portion of the sandwiches and asked to eat as much as they liked. Finally, they rated each item once more on the same scale. Here are the results: Read the rest of this post… | Read the comments on this post…

Philip Dawdy takes a interesting look at a new study of the safety of placebo arms in clinical trials of antidepressants in teens. My own quick scan of the study [which Dawdy makes available as pdf download ] suggests it’s full of great nuggets. Its take-home: Placebo treatments produced remission rates of 48%, while the rate for active treatment was 59%. And, quite interestingly, the study concludes: Patients who responded to placebo generally retained their response. Those who did not respond to placebo subsequently responded to active treatment at the same rates as those initiallyl assigned to active treatments. There were no differences between groups in rates of suicidal events, study retention, or symptom worsening. In other words, placebo left options open, and avoided most side-effects, at the cost of reaching 5 of 10 patients rather than 6 of 10. (Effectiveness rates of both placebo and treatment vary among trials; these are a bit higher than rates in other meta-analyses I’ve read, but fairly on target.) These findings are full of implications, some of which Dawdy lays out below. (Point of info: You’ll see different rates for ‘response’ and ‘remission’ here. Response means their symptoms eased at least a little. Remission means their symptoms lifted enough to classify them as no longer depressed.) Read the rest of this post… | Read the comments on this post…

Two months ago I posted about a short video created by a West Coast ministry depicting the alleged intervention of God in the life of a deeply troubled man, a presentation I discovered during a spin through Jared White’s site , “Finite Calls Infinite.” Jared’s observation : Check out what this guy went through and how God intervened supernaturally to change his life. It’s amazing! I wish they’d include more of the details, but it’s nevertheless an inspiration. No matter how far you’ve gone into the realms of darkness, God’s light will still penetrate! Given Jared’s enthusiasm, I expected to find that something remarkable had happened in Mike Leehan’s life–the “miraculous” curing of a disease, or even something as mundane as finding a winning lottery ticket in a bus terminal restroom immediately following a bout of prayer. If you watch the video, you find that what happened can fairly be summarized as: Man with clear mental issues and a history of conflicted feelings about God is visited by members of the ministry, and in their presence has a revelation in which God calls him to do His work for the rest of his life. Those are the facts. Yesterday, Jared apparently discovered my post and left a comment in which he asked: I have just one simple question for you: how do you know that whatever was described in this video isn’t actually true? On what basis do you accuse this man or this church of lying? Furthermore, aren’t scientists supposed to search out knowledge and meaning in spite of personal bias and follow the evidence wherever it may lead regardless of comfort level or preference? It seems to me that you’ve already decided how reality is framed, and thus anything that contradicts your predetermined conclusion you dismiss out of hand. I fail to see how that is scientific, open-minded, or free-thinking. I left a long reply, but it’s worth visiting what is going on here. Originally, I posted about this because Jared’s enthusiasm represents a classic example of confirmation bias . Religious folk often exemplify this interpretive flaw, which only makes sense; one who spends much of every day praying to or thinking about Jesus will naturally attribute events they perceive as remarkable in some way to divine authorship. In a world in which gods cannot be troubled to actually show themselves, this is understandable. Yet aside from the fact that private visions cannot constitute evidence for anything, the fact that non-Christians can and do have exactly the same kinds of “awakenings” as a result of a nearly infinite variety of experiences (praying to other gods; running 26 miles flat-out; dropping acid; transcendental meditation) underscores the reality–that people simply view “life-altering” experiences through the lens of their pre-existing beliefs. Note the gross error in Jared’s thinking. He sees a skeptical viewpoint as being not only mean-spirited but unscientific. In other words, because I dismiss the likelihood of God having anything to do with an event in which there is no evidentiary reason to suspect deities playing a role, I am being close-minded. Yet I doubt that he would consider himself closed-minded if he laughed off my claim that my own “salvation” from, say, a lengthy spell of depression is undeniably attributable to blessings from aliens from Altair-6. He would, I presume, expect me to support this claim in some way before accepting it. But he makes an exception, and a grossly unjustifiable one, for himself and other Christians. It’s that simple. I am also confident that Jared believes that he indeed arrived at his belief in the Christian deity because he was willing to “follow the evidence, wherever it may lead.” I don’t think he’s lying when he claims to have evidence for his god, as he implicitly does, but I would certainly invite him to present it. I am sure he will not–possibly with the observation that I’m a mocker who won’t change his mind anyway–and equally certain that he cannot. The point here is not to denigrate something that made Mike Leehan feel better or mock, in a throwaway manner, something that makes Jared and millions of other people feel better. It is to point out what a huge divide exists between religious believers and others in terms of what represents “freethought” and rational inquiry. People like Jared epitomize close-mindedness when they basically try to insulate their ideas from criticism despite having no evidence to support them. If you were to give all the Jareds of the world truth serum, some of them might admit that they arrived at their religious convictions–Christian, Hindu, Muslim, Zoroastrian or animist–first and have spent years since then trying to come up with justifications for their beliefs when challenged. But I think there’s something deeper at work; I think Jared (clearly an intelligent man) does think he has evidence for what he believes. But naturally he cannot articulate this, because he’s wrong. Watching people like Jared talk themselves in bumbling circles, if nothing else, provides an object lesson in how religious programming can forcefully disrupt or ruin someone’s ability to not only apply logic, but to comprehend it. To posit that something is true yet be unable to support this claim with evidence, yet label someone closed-minded for not accepting the same thing (one of countless takes on a basic delusion) at face value, is obviously loopy. But it’s part of the way millions of people approach the world every day. Anyway, if nothing else, maybe he and other Christians can read this and understand the real basis for skeptical inquiry. I have no more of an inherent commitment to denying a divine Jesus than I do my putative aliens or any other extraordinarily unlikely construct. But refusing to start from a conclusion and work backward is not closed-mindedness, however accompanied it may be by gratuitous jocularity. Read the comments on this post…